



STRATEGIC POLICING AND CRIME BOARD
Tuesday 3rd October 2017

**Playing our Part in Responding to National
Threats**

PURPOSE OF REPORT

1. The purpose of this report is to provide members of the Strategic Policing and Crime Board with information and an overview of progress against the Police and Crime Plan priorities in the section 'playing our part in responding to national threats'. This report will cover the following aspects of this plan:
 - Strategic Policing Requirement
 - Counter Terrorism
 - Regional Organised Crime Unit
 - National Ballistic Intelligence Service
 - Cybercrime

STRATEGIC POLICING REQUIREMENT

2. In July 2012 the Home Office published the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR). The document sets out the threats that require a national policing capability to ensure they are tackled effectively. The threats are:
 - Terrorism
 - Civil emergencies
 - Organised crime
 - Threats to public order
 - A large-scale cyber incident
 - Child Sexual Exploitation¹
3. The latest iteration of the West Midlands Police (WMP) response to the SPR is currently being prepared by the Force Intelligence Department to provide assurance to the Home Office of the force's ability to respond to the SPR threats. A further update on the outcomes of the SPR assessment will be provided

¹ Included from 2015, outside of the scope of this report.

in February 2018 so the following is a summary of early observations from this review.

4. WMP has demonstrated its capacity and capability to support the mobilisation of specialist resources on a number of occasions; including through the deployment of firearms officers, forensic officers and investigators in support of other forces and the Counter Terrorism network, following incidents such as the Manchester Attack and the Grenfell Tower fire. The force has also shown a capability to support an internal surge of specialist resources such as an uplift in firearms officers as required during the recent increases in national threat level.
5. WMP has met the requirements of the first stage of the National Armed Uplift Programme in expanding the size of the Firearms Operations Unit (FOU) to provide enhanced Armed Response Vehicle coverage. The FOU has also trained sufficient Specialist Firearms Officers (SFOs) to meet the second phase of the programme which is an uplift in the number of Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers (CTSFOs) by March 2018.
6. WMP has sufficient resilience to meet its primary mobilisation obligations for public order resources to respond to a national threat. The response to a prolonged national public order threat is likely to significantly impact on the force's ability to provide a local response to its own communities as neighbourhood officers will be required to backfill departments where public order resources will have been deployed from such as Force Response and the Force Support Unit. There are also some identified skills gaps for example neighbourhood officers not all being trained to the same driving levels as Force Response officers which would hamper their ability to provide this function.
7. As part of the emergency planning process WMP continually reviews its emergency response plans which are designed to mitigate against national threats and hazards. WMP considers the learning from national and local incidents and exercise debriefs to inform this process which supports the ability of the force to mobilise more effectively and efficiently in the future, as threats evolve. This was particularly evidenced following the recent Parson's Green terror attack when the response of the force to a change in the national threat level was more efficient than during previous incidents.
8. The ability of the force to respond to the national serious and organised crime threat is coordinated through ROCU WM. WMP has made improvements in its internal processes within the past twelve months to counter the local threat from serious organised crime, to respond to the feedback from the last HMIC inspection into this area. In addition to this, a consequence of the uplift in resources in the FOU has been the increased capability within WMP to meet the demand generated by firearms related criminality in the West Midlands.
9. WMP has not had a requirement to respond to a national cyber security incident within the past twelve months. The Wannacry threat was predominantly dealt with by the National Crime Agency (NCA). However, the resilience of WMP to continue its business and respond to national threats through its own infrastructure has been reviewed and continues to be enhanced in response to the ever emerging cyber threat. This activity is essential to ensure the security of WMP's information and its ability to respond is protected at periods of increased vulnerability.

COUNTER TERRORISM

10. The purpose of this section of the paper is to provide an update on the West Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit (WMCTU) and its capacity and capability to play its part in addressing national policing threats, namely the delivery of the HM Government's counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST):

- Pursue – to stop terrorist attacks
- Prevent – to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism
- Protect – to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack
- Prepare – to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack

CURRENT TERRORIST THREAT

11. The UK faces a serious and challenging threat from International Terrorism. The current threat level is SEVERE – an attack is highly likely. The UK threat level was raised to CRITICAL – an attack is expected imminently – in May 2017 following the attack at Manchester arena and in September 2017 following the Parson's Green attack. Since threat levels were published in 2006, these were only the third and fourth occasions when the threat level has risen to this status.

12. The level of attacks experienced in the UK in the last 12 months has been unprecedented and attacks have displayed a range of attack methodology, including the use of bladed weapons, vehicles and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Increasingly terrorist attacks are being carried out by lone actors rather than a network of individuals which presents a serious and challenging threat. In addition the ease and effectiveness of low complexity attacks continue to make them difficult to detect.

13. Domestic Extremism also presents a threat to the UK. The West Midlands has seen a large increase in the number of referrals as a result of the UK terrorist attacks. The number of Extreme Right Wing (XRW) ideologies is increasing and becoming comparable to the number referred for Islamist ideologies.

14. The neo-Nazi organisation National Action (NA) continues as an emerging issue in light of their on-going activity in the West Midlands since the proscription of the group in December 2016.

15. Across the UK there has been an increase in animal rights activity. There is regular activity at abattoirs and a multi organisation demonstration took place in Birmingham City Centre in April 2017.

16. The current threat level for Northern Ireland-related terrorism in Northern Ireland is SEVERE (an attack is highly likely) and the current threat level for Northern Ireland-related terrorism in Britain is SUBSTANTIAL (an attack is a strong possibility).

WMCTU STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

17. West Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit (WMCTU) is one of eleven regional counter terrorism units (CTU) and intelligence units (CTIU), which bring together intelligence, operations and investigation functions, engaging with a range of partners to prevent terrorist activity.

18. WMCTU gathers intelligence and evidence to help prevent, disrupt and prosecute terrorists and terrorist activities. It provides coordination and specialist support and has a wide range of expertise including skilled detectives, financial investigators, analysts, forensic specialists and high-tech Investigator.

19. WMCTU's Regional Strategic Tasking has set the following four priority areas:

- Terrorism Linked to Syria and Iraq
- Domestic Extremism
- Domestic Threat and cross-overs between Terrorism and Organised Crime
- Emerging Terrorist Threats

20. WMCTU leads on Pursue activity and supports the regional forces to deliver Prevent, Protect and Prepare activity. All activity and performance is monitored through the Force and Regional Quarterly CONTEST Boards chaired by Assistant Chief Constable (Security).

PURSUE

Investigations

21. Below are examples of some of the investigative activity WMCTU has undertaken during the reporting period:

- Following a complex 22 week trial which received significant media coverage four men were found guilty of preparing for terrorist attacks and sentenced to life. This followed an arrest on 26 August 2016 of the men (two from Birmingham and two from Stoke on Trent) found in possession of an improvised explosive device, imitation firearm, machete and other items which were to be used in an attack.
- WMCTU provided assistance to Metropolitan Police's Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) during the investigation of Westminster terrorist attack on 22 March 2017. The offender lived in Birmingham and rented the vehicle used in the attack in Birmingham prior to travelling to London.
- WMCTU provided assistance to North West Counter Terrorism Unit during the investigation of the Manchester Arena terrorist attack on 22nd May 2017. The assistance included specialist Forensic Management staff, who had the harrowing task of examining the crime scene, and investigators.
- WMCTU provided assistance to Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) during the investigation of the London Bridge terrorist attack on 3rd June 2017. WMCTU carried out activity within West Midlands region in support of this investigation and supplied investigative staff to assist with enquiries in London. This included the deployment of Family Liaison Officers who supported the families of two of the deceased from the attack.
- In June 2017 WMCTU assisted Spanish Authorities with the arrest and extradition of a Birmingham resident subject of a European Arrest Warrant for being part of a European wide cell encouraging support for ISIL

- In January 2017 a Stoke male was arrested and charged with inciting terrorism. His trial is due to take place in September 2017.
- In February 2017 a Walsall based male, arrested in Turkey for trying to enter Syria to fight for ISIL was deported back to the UK and arrested and charged by WMCTU with preparing for terrorist attacks.
- In April 2017 three people in Birmingham were arrested on suspicion of preparing a terrorist act and all three were subsequently charged and remanded in custody to face trial in November 2017.
- In June 2017 WMCTU arrested and charged a Birmingham man for distributing terrorist material. He was subsequently remanded in custody for trial in November 2017.
- In June 2017 two students from Birmingham and Leicester, arrested in Turkey for trying to enter Syria to fight for ISIL were deported back to the UK and arrested by WMCTU on suspicion of preparing for terrorist attacks. They were released on police bail.
- In June 2017 a Welsh male was arrested and charged with preparing for terrorist acts. His trial is set for November.
- In July 2017 a Coventry female was arrested and charged with preparing for terrorist acts in travelling to Syria to join ISIS. Her trial is due to take place in October 2017.
- In August 2017 a Birmingham man was found guilty of membership of ISIL and inciting terrorism and was sentenced to six years imprisonment.
- In September 2017 four men were arrested, including one male from Birmingham, for being members of a proscribed organisation and three were charged with that and other offences.

Consequence Management Plans

22. WMCTU is fully engaged with Neighbourhood Policing Units to ensure the consequences for counter-terrorism activity within neighbourhoods and communities is managed and mitigated.
23. A detailed 'consequence management plan' is developed for all overt counter-terrorism activity undertaken such as arrests or significant events such as court trials. The plans build upon local policing engagement within neighbourhoods and with key individuals to fully consider local context and concerns. The plans set out comprehensive media strategies and agree key messages for stakeholders in order to maintain the trust and confidence of communities.
24. WMCTU routinely provides confidential counter-terrorism briefings to the Office of Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC), Neighbourhood Policing Unit Commanders, Local Authority Chief Executives and other key partners. WMCTU provides counter-terrorism awareness briefings to community groups including Independent Advisory Groups and business groups (Project GRIFFIN)

Counter-Terrorism Family Liaison Officers

25. WMCTU has commissioned additional training to increase the number of Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) able to be deployed to counter-terrorism incidents. The training has included officers from West Midlands Police Force CID and Public Protection Units as well as Staffordshire, West Mercia and Warwickshire police forces. WMCTU has appointed a new Family Liaison Co-ordinator.
26. CT FLOs supported two West Midlands families during the inquest into the 30 UK citizens who were murdered in a terrorist attack whilst on holiday in Port El Kantaoui, Tunisia during June 2015. Four of these victims (three from one family) came from the West Midlands region and FLOs have been deployed with both families (working to national FLO strategy) since the incident.

PREVENT

27. WMCTU continues to support the West Midlands Police Prevent Board, chaired by Chief Superintendent Kenny Bell (Birmingham East NPU).
28. WMCTU delivered briefings to each Local Authority Chief Executive and their respective Police Commander during April and May 2017 and briefings to each of the Local Authority Prevent Boards. These briefings have helped shape and direct each of the Local Authority Prevent delivery plans – each of which have set objectives.
29. In addition WMCTU has implemented a new five point Regional Prevent delivery plan based on Consequence Management; Contact Officers; Prevent Case Management; Safeguarding and Community Resilience.

Prevent Case Management

30. Prevent Case Management (PCM) is the process by which all Prevent referrals within the West Midlands region are managed.
31. The Channel programme is one of the tactical options available under PCM. It is a specific intervention which focuses on providing support at an early stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. The programme uses a multi-agency approach to protect vulnerable people by: identifying individuals at risk; assessing the nature and extent of that risk; and developing the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned.
32. Channel referral data is shared with the West Midlands Police Prevent Board. There has been a steady increase in referrals in the past four months nationally and this has been reflected across the West Midlands.
33. WMCTU has commissioned a review of Prevent Case Management within the region. The review has considered best practice from West Midlands Police's acclaimed Integrated Offender Management (IOM) programme and a refreshed approach to PCM is set to be rolled out in October 2017.
34. The 'Prevent in Place (PIP)' pilot has now operated for 17 months (from April 2016). The pilot involves staff from Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health

Foundation Trust seconded into WMCTU to review referred cases and help access appropriate mental health services. The PIP team have received 360 referrals during this time and have been able to successfully facilitate mental health support for over 110 of these subjects. First Episode Psychosis has been identified in 10 of the cases with appropriate support identified and offered. These figures are in line with various studies and research that have shown that 40% of people drawn into terrorism have a mental health problem. The pilot has received strong evaluation as to its effectiveness and is being rolled out as the national model across Counter Terrorism Units.

Child Protection & Safeguarding

35. 'Project CAIREEN' is a joint protocol between West Midlands Police Public Protection Unit (PPU) and WMCTU. It provides detailed guidance on child protection and safeguarding issues linked to terrorism and extremism. The draft guidance was formally approved in August 2017 and is envisaged as a living, which can be amended as effective practice develops. All seven Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCB) have been fully briefed on the guidance.
36. WMCTU is engaged with the Birmingham City Council Chief Social Worker and Chair of the Regional Social Work Effective Practice Group to develop joint work exploring effective protocols for safeguarding based on the work he has published and implemented elsewhere using 'signs of safety'. This recognises the volume of work WMCTU has done with Birmingham City Council and offers potential to develop nationally influential good practice in this growing area of business for CT policing.

Community Resilience

37. There is a direct link between West Midlands Police's 'Active Citizens' work and the work of WMCTU to build community resilience and capacity to resisting terrorism and extremism.
38. In March 2017, WMCTU commissioned a report on regional Prevent engagement activity by the social capital consultants Mutual Gain. Using a World Café type event to harness community and partner views the report identified a number of recommendations which are currently being implemented. These recommendations include the bespoke training of selected WMCTU officers and WMP Police Community Support Officers in the principles of building social capital and developing West Midlands Police's 'connect and build' activity to tackle extremism within communities.
39. A significant number of projects continue alongside day to day engagement of WMCTU officers with local Neighbourhood Policing Team such as the 'Our Families, Our Future' programme in Coventry and Birmingham.
40. The formation of a Regional Partnership Steering Group is under discussion to ensure effective evaluation of counter-extremism projects in order to better understand 'what works'. As per HM Government's CONTEST strategy, Local Authorities and their Prevent Co-ordinators continue to lead on Prevent engagement fully supported by WMCTU.

PROTECT AND PREPARE

41. WMCTU continues to support the West Midlands Police Protect & Prepare Board chaired by Chief Superintendent David Sturman (Head of Operations).
42. The value of effective relationships and governance at regional Chief Officer level has been highlighted following the terrorist attacks suffered in the UK and abroad in recent months.
43. The regional protective security response to the changing threat levels is co-ordinated by the Regional Protect and Prepare Board. The Board, which meets monthly or when required, is chaired by WMCTU and attended by the Heads of Operations from each regional force as well as a range of partners including West Midlands Ambulance Service, West Midlands Fire Service and the military. The Board has recently agreed renewed terms of reference, strategy and a delivery plan.
44. In March, following the London Westminster attack the Board developed a regional Protect and Prepare plan.
45. In May, following the Manchester terrorist attack, the Board co-ordinated the regional response to the uplift in armed policing following the national decision to implement aspects of Operation TEMPERER (military support).
46. In June, following the London Bridge terrorist attack, the Board co-ordinated the regional response to ensure appropriate vehicle mitigation measures were in place at strategic locations within the region.
47. WMP implemented a comprehensive programme of plan/procedure reviews, training programmes and testing/exercising regimes which have been reviewed through the Force CONTEST Board.
48. WMCTU has delivered a series of briefings and continuous professional development days for senior officers across the region focusing on preparedness and planning for potential terrorist attacks.
49. Throughout August 2017 WMCTU organised the 'Stay Alert' campaign - a series of counter-terrorism briefings aimed at WMP officers and police staff to raise awareness of how they can stay safe at home, work and when travelling. The briefing sessions helped staff to understand the threat from terrorism, enabled people to recognise hostile reconnaissance, provided guidance on what to do in the unlikely event of an attack and reinforced the 'Run, Hide, Tell' messaging.
50. Finally, WMCTU continues to support forces with a series of regional tests and exercises to test capabilities and learn lessons to improve its Prepare planning cycle. WMCTU is developing a regional annual calendar of testing and exercising to maximise benefits and learning for regional partners.

THE REGIONAL ORGANISED CRIME UNIT (ROCU)

51. The purpose of this section of the paper is to provide an update on the development of the ROCU network at a regional and national level during this reporting period. The document will also summarise regional collaboration arrangements.

NATIONAL LANDSCAPE

52. During this reporting period the Home Office has confirmed that the ROCU network is to receive a series of grants from the Police Transformation Fund to develop/enhance the following capabilities in order to improve its response to organised crime:

- Regional organised crime threat assessment teams – focussed on improving the understanding of the threat from organised crime through the regionalisation of the Organised Crime Group Mapping (OCGM) database.
- Assisting offender debrief teams – focussed on increasing police use of Sections 71 to 75 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA) to debrief offenders who have offered to assist with the investigation or prosecution of offences committed by others.
- Serious and Organised Crime disruptions teams – focussed on developing links with the GAIN network to lead a multi-agency approach to disrupting organised crime groups in support of, and in addition to, seeking criminal justice outcomes.
- On line undercover activity – with a particular emphasis on tackling child sexual abuse and exploitation.

53. The Regional ROCU Executive Board is due to meet on 9th October 2017 to consider the most efficient and effective use of this funding in order to better protect the communities of the West Midlands region.

54. Meanwhile, it has been agreed by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) that responsibility for the United Kingdom Protected Persons Service (UK PPS), currently delivered via the ROCU network, will be transferred from police forces to the National Crime Agency. The funding arrangements for this transition are currently being considered by the Home Office.

HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY (HMIC) INSPECTION

55. During this reporting period the ROCU was inspected by HMIC. The Inspection team acknowledged the significant growth and development of the ROCU since the 2015 Inspection and concluded that there is a vastly improved approach to tackling serious organised crime at a local, regional and national level.

56. There are some areas for consideration detailed in the report, most notably the need to develop a regional IT platform and improve management of organised crime group mapping. These matters were already identified on the departmental risk register and are being addressed through the ROCU Executive Board.

57. HMIC also noted that the ROCU had updated the regional Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) Strategy for the 2017/18 performance year to address concerns arising from the force level inspections in 2016/17.
58. The ROCU has worked closely with the WMP SOC lead, Detective Superintendent Jenny Skyrme, throughout this reporting period to ensure a co-ordinated approach to the latest WMP HMIC Inspection, which took place in September 2017.


REGIONAL CONTEXT

59. During this reporting period the ROCU Executive Board commissioned a review of:
- ROCU operating principles and priorities
 - Regional capabilities and service levels
 - Governance arrangements for 2017/18
 - The regional confidential unit capacity and capability
 - The people deal / workforce strategy / HR activity being undertaken to create consistent standards and expectations.
60. These documents have been signed off by each force's Assistant Chief Constable with ROCU responsibility and the Regional Deputy Chief Constables' Governance Group. Given that the legal collaboration agreement places a specific obligation on the Head of ROCU to complete an annual review of the standard operating principles, these documents also require sign off by the signatories of the legal agreement. Both documents were therefore submitted to and approved by the regional Chief Constables and Police Crime Commissioners at the regional meeting in April 2017.
61. The legal collaboration agreement for the provision of the Regional Organised Crime Unit of the West Midlands region came into effect in 2016 and was signed by each Chief Constable and Police and Crime Commissioner for the region.
62. The development of the ROCU during the 2016/17 performance year led to material changes in the functions delivered by the ROCU that, in turn, necessitated a formal review ahead of the 2017/18 performance year.
63. The review has therefore been completed and the s.22 agreement updated in order to ensure that the operational, legal and reputational risks associated with regional collaboration have been thoroughly considered and mitigated.
64. The ROCU Executive Board has also commissioned a full efficiency review of the ROCU during the 2017/18 performance year in order to identify and realise opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the functions that are now delivered regionally. The first phase of this review has been completed and the findings will be presented to the ROCU Executive Board on 9th October 2017 in order to inform policy decisions regarding the on-going development of the ROCU.

PERFORMANCE

65. During this reporting period the ROCU produced the 2017/18 Strategic Assessment which sets out how the intelligence department has worked with each

regional force, the National Crime Agency and other law enforcement partners in order to identify the following priorities for the forthcoming performance year:



- 66. The ROCU continues to submit Organised Crime Group (OCG) disruptions in line with the national ROCU performance framework and the regionalisation of the operational teams has significantly enhanced the number and quality of disruption returns.
- 67. The National ROCU Disruptions Coordinator uses this data and supporting information to inform the National ROCU Executive Board, Heads of ROCU, Monthly Minister’s Highlight Report & Quarterly Dashboards and the Weekly Home Secretary’s Meeting.
- 68. Disruptions can only be recorded in relation to activity by mapped OCGs that are owned and managed by the ROCU. Assisted disruptions are recorded in relation to ROCU activity against OCGs that are mapped and owned by regional forces. No disruptions are recorded in relation to activity against individuals or groups that are not mapped.

FINANCIAL INFORMATION

- 69. The phased creation of the ROCU over a number of years, together with changes to the grant arrangements from the Home Office, has created a complex financial planning model that is inconsistent with the financial principles set out in the ROCU operating model.

70. The outcome is two different funding models being applied across different elements of the department with some of the original capabilities (e.g. Regional Intelligence Unit, Regional Prison intelligence Unit, UK Protected Persons Unit) being financed through fixed contributions while newer capabilities are funded on a resource contribution basis in line with the funding formula.
71. The combination of the two funding models has created a complicated picture throughout 2016/17.
72. The ROCU Executive Board has therefore documented a set of financial principles to be applied to all ROCU capabilities and ensured that separate budget management of force only capabilities delivered through the ROCU governance took effect from the April 2017.
73. The Executive Board has also commissioned a review of the funding arrangements for non-staff costs by the finance directors for each force area. The consensus of this group is that it would not be possible to complete this work in time for each force to incorporate the costs into their budgets for the 2018/19 financial year and the proposed implementation date is therefore 1st April 2019.

NATIONAL BALLISTICS INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NABIS)

74. NABIS was established in 2008 as a national unit hosted by WMP and Greater Manchester Police with WMP acting as the lead host force. The purpose of NABIS is to examine firearms and ballistic material to provide an intelligence picture of the criminal use of firearms. NABIS is accountable to the NPCC and sits under the Crime Business Area, under the Violence and Public Protection portfolio.
75. ACC Gary Cann is the Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) for NABIS and chairs the NABIS Governance Board. This board is comprised of representatives from the main Gun Crime Forces, the Director of Finance for WMP, the Chief Executive from WMP OPCC, the Home Office and the Forensic Regulator. The Governance Board meets twice a year and scrutinises the performance of NABIS, financial spend and forecasts, reviews the NABIS risk register and consider any proposals NABIS wants to make regarding the future direction of work.
76. The NABIS Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that sets out the requirements for forces to submit items to NABIS and the Service Level Agreement (SLA) for NABIS examination and reporting timescales.
77. A Sec 22a Collaboration agreement will have been signed by all Home Office forces and PCCs by the end of September 2017. This collaboration agreement sets out what forces can expect from NABIS and what NABIS and the host forces can expect from the other forces.
78. NABIS on behalf of the NPCC Criminal Use of Firearms lead supports the Firearms Independent Advisory Group, which meets on a quarterly basis. NABIS updates the meeting on the current threat and seeks the views of the group on planned work.
79. NABIS supports the quarterly National Criminal Use of Firearms meetings, chaired by the NPCC lead and chairs the National Intelligence Managers' meeting for Criminal Use of Firearms.

NABIS PERFORMANCE

80. On a quarterly basis NABIS sends forces an Effective Management Information (EMI) report. This report details the submissions made to NABIS by each force and the extent to which the service level agreement for timeliness of reports has been achieved. Due to a national increase in the criminal use of firearms and firearms discharges over the last two years there has been a 92% increase in urgent and seven day submissions to NABIS and as a result of this the SLA to forces has not been achieved.
81. A business case was submitted to the NPCC for additional funding to recruit two ballistic experts and two ballistic technicians to manage this increase in demand. The bid was approved and the new members of staff will all be in post shortly.
82. NABIS produces a number of intelligence products for forces, agencies and the Home Office, to support the national work to tackle the criminal use of firearms, including;
 - Quarterly intelligence reports
 - An annual strategic assessment

- Problem profiles
- Bespoke reports such as the threat from automatic firearms
- Linked series packages.

83. The NABIS Force Liaison Officer regularly visits forces to support them in developing their internal systems and processes as well as providing training to detectives on the work of NABIS. The department regularly provides statements for court purposes, to show the prevalence of certain firearms and ammunition.
84. NABIS is currently leading on the planning of a national firearms surrender due to take place in November this year (13th – 26th). Once complete NABIS will examine firearms meeting the MOU criteria and provide a report on all recoveries made. This firearms surrender has the support of the West Midlands PCC who has written to PCCs requesting their support for this initiative.
85. NABIS leads on the delivery of the operational action plans contained in the Firearms EMPACT (European multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats) and chairs the European Firearms Experts Group. This work is aimed at reducing the threat to the UK from the criminal use of firearms from abroad. NABIS is currently supporting the Home Office and Foreign Commonwealth Office on a programme of work to tackle the threat from firearms in the Western Balkans region to try to prevent them reaching the UK.

NABIS MANAGEMENT

86. The Head of NABIS is responsible for the day to day running of the department but meets on regular basis with the SRO. Internal quarterly tasking meetings are held to identify those forces that do not appear to be complying with the MoU. These forces are given additional support by NABIS staff to identify any blockages, to share best practice from other forces and provide training where required.
87. NABIS holds a weekly senior leadership meeting to review internal issues and agree actions and monthly meetings to review the risk register, monitor health and safety, consider personnel and training issues and anything else relevant to the smooth running of NABIS.
88. As part of the future planning for NABIS a bid has been submitted to the Police Transformation Fund. If the bid is successful its purpose will be to establish a project team to design a new national approach to ballistic intelligence. NABIS has passed the initial stages of the process and is awaiting a final decision from the Home Secretary. The Head of NABIS will act as the project SRO. The NABIS SRO and Governance Board will provide independent scrutiny of the project development and proposals.

CYBERCRIME

89. Cybercrime is a broad and generic term that refers to crimes committed using computers and the internet. WMP's strategy aims to address both cyber-dependent (i.e. those crimes that can only be committed using a computer) and cyber-enabled criminality (i.e. those crimes, the proliferation of which, are significantly enhanced through the use of computers).

CYBERCRIME STRATEGIC PLAN

90. The WMP strategic vision for Cybercrime is that by 2020 WMP will be a world leading, digitally aware and enabled, law enforcement body that effectively reduces the threat to the people and businesses of the West Midlands from Cybercrime.

91. WMP's strategic vision will be achieved through delivery of a five point plan.

- i. Our capability will address all elements of Cybercrime from cyber-dependent to mainstream digital policing.
- ii. Our people will be aware, skilled and equipped to respond to all levels of Cybercrime.
- iii. Our response will be tiered and delivered in partnership: with regional and national law enforcement agencies, through cross government arrangements, with private industry and with academia.
- iv. Our focus will be on protecting individuals and businesses that are most vulnerable by reducing the threat of Cybercrime.
- v. Cybersecurity will be a consideration in all our operational policing responses and our internal processes.

92. Delivery of this plan is governed by a Cybercrime sub-group reporting to the Digital Board. Strategic leads have responsibility for delivery of action plans against each of the 4Ps: Pursue, Protect, Prevent and Prepare.

THE THREAT

93. Cybercrime recording in the UK is led by Action Fraud. Victims are encouraged nationally to report directly to Action Fraud who in turn triage that report, record it and then refer those reports that are deemed to have investigative potential to the relevant force. Where victims do report directly to WMP, the report will still be referred to Action Fraud in line with national policy, but the victim will also be directed to appropriate information and tools to ensure that they are immediately safeguarded and protected from potential future attacks.

94. Data from Action Fraud indicates that in the last financial year, April 2016 to March 2017, the following Cybercrimes were recorded in the West Midlands force area:

- Cyber dependent crimes: 643 Total loss estimated at £620,000
- Cyber enabled crimes: 516 Total loss estimated at £1,903,000

95. Of these crimes only 6% related to businesses and 88% related to individual victims. Of the 643 cyber dependent crimes, between October 2016 and July 2017, only 88 (14%) were referred on to WMP for investigation.

96. In the first half of the year hacking of social media and email accounts was the most prevalent cyber dependent crime. In the second half of the year Malware infections were most prevalent.

97. Throughout the year 'Computer Service Fraud' has been the most prevalent form of cyber enabled crime. This includes such incidents as where a criminal purports to represent Microsoft, for example, and asks the victim to provide online access to their computer to remedy a fabricated software fault or to provide passwords, thus enabling the criminal to access accounts, information and funds.
98. In addition to reported crime Action Fraud is also able to access data provided by industry which remains unreported. Using reported data on Malware infections as a comparator against the industry data, this would suggest that up to 16 times more individual internet protocol addresses in the West Midlands are being infected than are being reported. Cybercrime therefore remains a hidden crime.
99. Victims of Cybercrime are receiving an ever improving service from WMP, but the ability of the force to accurately tailor its response remains a challenge whilst so much data remains inaccessible.

THE WMP RESPONSE TO CYBER CRIME

100. It is estimated that up to 85% of cyber-attacks can be prevented through the use of reasonable precautions such as regularly downloading software updates, using firewalls and anti-virus and by adopting secure passwords. The WMP strategy is therefore heavily focused on the 'Protect' element.
101. Cyber dependent crime can have a footprint that is entirely limited to a geographic locality, however the very nature of the internet means that very often victims, perpetrators and networks are located in different jurisdictions. WMP has therefore invested in the Regional Cybercrime Unit which is in turn co-located with the National Crime Agency. This enables WMP to escalate significant attacks quickly through regional and national tasking structures and to draw upon specialist assistance when required.
102. WMP also maintains a significant amount of Cybercrime expertise within the force Economic Crime Unit, recognising that a significant proportion of cyber-enabled crime amounts to fraud.
103. Digital Media Investigators are also based within all investigation teams. These officers are able to handle digital media and evidence and to advise investigating officers on digital investigation techniques and capabilities.
104. Training is now being provided to all Force Contact officers and staff so that WMP can be assured that any reports received are being channelled appropriately, including through Action Fraud, recorded accurately and that victims are receiving the requisite support and have access to tools and advice provided by GetSafeOnline.
105. To this end a contract has been negotiated with GetSafeOnline to provide information and communication resources to support the WMP Cybercrime protect strategy. This includes monthly themed campaigns, a tailored website, social media products and three major events each year with a range of industry partners leveraged by GetSafeOnline. The ability of WMP to help protect communities online, in partnership with GetSafeOnline, has been funded through the Proceeds of Crime Act, reclaimed from criminal assets.

106. Given the emphasis on 'protect' in addressing the threat from Cybercrime, partnership work is essential. In addition to the arrangements detailed already, greater coordination of business expertise is being sought. Cyber security clusters have been well established in some parts of the UK but to date the West Midlands region has never benefitted from such an arrangement. These clusters are run by business partners for business partners and enable the effective sharing of knowledge and expertise and the development of capability to thwart developing threats. They facilitate coordinated engagement with the national Cyber Information Sharing Partnership. Through concerted engagement with the ROCU Prevent team and influence through their established network, WMP has now been able to bring about the inaugural meeting of the West Midlands Cyber Security Cluster (WM CSC) on the 21st September.
107. The force is also hoping to draw upon greater engagement with partners to help develop the skills of WMP personnel. Aston University has already engaged with the force in the provision of student placements across a number of departments, and it is intended to expand this now to incorporate Cybercrime and cybersecurity disciplines. It is hoped the WM CSC will facilitate the development of a cyber-special cadre. We have also engaged with Police Now to develop bespoke placements for WMP for students with digital skills.
108. All current activity in response to the threat from Cybercrime is governed through a strategic group led by the Head of Intelligence and reporting to the Force Executive Team. Within the group are four individual leads for the areas of 'pursue', 'protect', 'prevent' and 'prepare', each owning an individual action plan, designed to deliver activity in support of the strategy above.
109. This has included the initiation of a Cybercrime project through the force's transformation programme, WMP2020, intended to review and service the force's aspirations to continually improve its response to Cybercrime in an effective, efficient and sustainable manner. The Senior Responsible Officer has now been appointed and is formulating a detailed business case and project plan that will be presented before the Organisational Change Board in due course.

WMP PREPAREDNESS

110. WMP's internal security measures are robust so that the force is resilient, should it face an attack and so that the public can remain assured of continued service in such circumstances.
111. In addition to the investigation of those crimes referred to WMP through Action Fraud and Force Contact, WMP maintains a highly effective proactive capability that is not detailed in this paper for reasons of operational security. However, some investigations naturally draw media attention, such as the WannaCry ransomware attacks experienced globally in May 2017. This malware predominantly preyed upon systems running on old operating systems without requisite security updates. Many of the systems used by the National Health Service were in particular vulnerable to this attack and experienced system failure as a result.
112. WMP was made aware of this attack and immediately initiated an operational plan coordinated locally through Mission Support. Given the global nature of the attack the National Cyber Security Centre was involved and coordinated the national effort. The regional Cybercrime unit provided specialist investigative

support ready to deploy should any victimised individual or organisation be identified in the West Midlands area. Such organisations were identified locally and were supported by ROCU and WMP colleagues. Mission Support in turn coordinated a local response for consequence management, drew upon force resources and enabled a communication strategy to be developed with partners through the corporate communications department. In line with the force strategy, WMP potential vulnerabilities were explored by the Information Management and IT & Digital departments. Assurance was provided that all systems remained operational and resilient in the face of the threat. The response to this global threat was effectively maintained, day and night, throughout the weekend until dissipated.

113. In addition to this very real operational test, WMP strategic leads for Cybercrime took part in a recent national exercise, designed to test our response to a range of cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crimes and attacks. This table-top exercise, conducted in partnership with regional and national partners, has provided assurance that our existing processes equip us to deal effectively with a wide range of threats, but also provided valuable learning which is now being disseminated and implemented across the force.

EVALUATION OF THE GET SAFE ONLINE CONTRACT

114. The GetSafeOnline contract has been secured with £10,000 of funding recovered from proceeds of crime. Provision is made for a range of tools and information sources both online and off covering personal online security, security of mobile devices, safeguarding of children, secure shopping and banking online, secure use of social networks, and safety online for small and medium enterprises. A new campaign is launched every month and specially tailored resources are supplied in support of this. The online resources are in turn engineered to different formats so that they can be immediately disseminated across a range of platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram etc.
115. GetSafeOnline provides bespoke web pages for WMP so that customers and victims can be instantly signposted whether seeking advice in order to protect themselves online or reporting as a victim of crime.
116. These facilities have now been linked to the recently launched online reporting capability Force Contact Officers are also all now being trained to recognise vulnerability online and to make use of these facilities when engaging with members of the public.
117. The first major partnership event took place at the Godiva Festival in Coventry in July. GetSafeOnline set up a series of stalls and tents to offer advice and guidance. Facilities were provided to test personal devices free of charge in order to identify vulnerabilities and to help individuals to address such issues. In a single day over 2000 individual interactions took place.
118. The next planned event will focus on the needs of individuals and small and medium enterprises through a full day conference on the 31st October. The venue and agenda are being finalised, but GetSafeOnline will facilitate presentations from FTSE100 C-Suite representatives in addition to those provided by WMP and local partners.
119. The final event will be arranged thereafter and is effectively a 'train the trainer' event. Building on the success of the Digital PCSO, WMP will work with specialist trainers from GetSafeOnline to upskill front line officers and PCSOs. The intention

is that these personnel should be able to offer advice regarding online protection with the same level of confidence with which they would advise on burglary and vehicle crime prevention, for example.

120. Opportunities to commission additional services will continue, but the GetSafeOnline contract continues to provide value for money across a necessary range of essential resources.

UPDATE ON THE WORK OF THE DIGITAL PCSO

121. In July 2017, in partnership with the Regional Cybercrime Unit, WMP hired its first digital PCSO. PCSO Sean Long was recruited to this role and now has an online persona, social media accounts and individually crafted avatar. PCSO Long works with community groups, schools and small and medium sized enterprises to promote digital security and raise awareness of online crime and vulnerability.

122. Although only officially launched on the 31st August 2017 (which incorporated a series of radio and television interviews), his social media footprint has already developed:

- Facebook: 84 followers with 3-5 messages per day being posted
- Twitter: 1,080 followers – 127 tweets average per month – 1,000 profile visits per month average – 128,000 tweet impressions per month average – averaging 50 new followers per month.

123. PCSO Long has presented at nine public events so far, including to Women in Business, Cyber Schools, RBS, Curdworth Primary School, Institute of Chartered Accountants, Independent Advisory Group meeting, Internal briefings to the Force Contact department, Compass Community group and the Cyber Security UK roadshow

124. The initiative has got off to a strong start and has established an excellent foothold for the development of skills and confidence amongst WMP's frontline officers and staff.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

125. None apparent.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

126. None apparent.

RECOMMENDATIONS

127. The Board is asked to note the contents of this report.

ACC Gareth Cann

Security and Serious Organised Crime Portfolio